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Is the Sun Still Rising In The East?
Japanese defence acquisition in the 21st century is still very much a work in progress as the 
country seeks to re-equip its armed forces and reform the acquisition process.
By Peter Antill
Despite being defeated at the end of World War II, and being the only country in the world to have 
had nuclear weapons used against it, 
Japan has emerged from devastation 
and occupation to become a major 
regional military power and a world 
economic power. It boasted the third 
largest economy in the world in 2014 
with a gross domestic product of 
$4.6 trillion.1 
   However, the traumatic experience of 
World War II has consistently shaped 
Japan’s foreign and defence policy, 
and thereby its view of how it structures, 
operates, equips and supports its 
armed forces. It is only in the last few 
years that such an outlook has started 
to change, primarily with the coming 
to power of Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party. This 
article looks at the current state of the 
Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDFs), 
its defence acquisition policies as well as 
the economic, strategic and geopolitical 
factors that have shaped them.
DECLINING DEFENCE 
BUDGETS
   Like Germany, many of Japan’s 
cities were destroyed by Allied strategic 
bombing. At the end of World War II, 
its economy was in ruins. While Japan 
did not receive the same direct aid 
as Germany did under the Marshall 
Plan, it beneﬁ tted from a number of 
developments that took place during the 
war itself (rapid industrial development) 
and during the Cold War that followed 
(such as the US policy towards Japan, 
the state of the international market, 
industry’s drive to expand and take on 
risk and the willingness of the Japanese 
government to work with industry). 
   Japan, like Germany, had its own 
‘economic miracle’ and between 1950 
and 1973, Japanese gross national 
product grew by 10% a year with only 
a few minor downturns. Despite the 
oil shocks of the early 1970s, Japan 
still managed modest growth into 
the mid-1990s. The last two decades 
however, have seen sluggish economic 
growth, due to several factors including 
inﬂ exibility in the Japanese economy, 
greater international competition, 
government protectionism and the still 
lingering after effects of the asset price 
bubble collapse, corporate restructuring 
and the banking crisis. Increased 
spending, in part due to an ageing 
population and frequent government 
stimulus packages, mainly ﬁ nanced 
through increased borrowing, has 
led Japan to have the highest gross 
government debt in the OECD—226% 
of GDP in 2014.2
   Despite the growth in China’s 
economic and military power, the 
domestic economic situation led 
Japan to adopt a de-facto policy of 
maintaining defence spending at 1% 
of GDP.  Since 2005, defence spending 
has increased slowly ($42 billion in 
2015 compared to $47.7 billion in 
2014) and has actually decreased as a 
percentage of the government’s overall 
spending. It is in line with the broader 
trend across the Asia-Paciﬁ c where 
many countries, while spending more 
on defence, are seeing defence budgets 
decrease as a percentage of GDP, with 
the priority shifting towards national 
infrastructure, public education and 
healthcare. The region has also seen 
the percentage of the labour force in 
military service decline, not because of 
any particular move to downsize their 
Defence Procurement International - Summer 2016
10
PROCUREMENT
Defence Procurement International - Summer 2016
11
The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force 
submarine JS Hakuryu arrives at the 
submarine piers of Joint Base Pearl 
Harbour-Hickam (US Navy photo by Mass 
Communication Specialist 1st Class Steven Khor)
military forces, but due to economic 
growth creating increased opportunities 
in civilian occupations. Even Japan has 
experienced this competition for labour, 
with applications for military jobs falling 
by 20% between 2014 and 2015.3 
BORDER AND TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTES
   Staying with the theme of economics 
for a moment, the economic growth 
and increase in trade (both regionally 
and with the rest of the world) has been 
viewed by some as feeding directly into 
the strategic factors affecting the region, 
in this case, an arms build-up, especially 
in terms of maritime military power. The 
argument is, that:4
t&DPOPNJDHSPXUIIBTMFEUPBO
expansion in maritime commerce;
t5IFFYQBOTJPOJONBSJUJNFDPNNFSDF
has led ﬁ rstly, to an increase in piracy, 
and secondly, a change in defence 
policy focus by China;
t5IFTFJOUVSOIBWFDBVTFEQPMJDZ
responses from other powers in 
the region. As the economies in the 
region have expanded and trade 
increased, the importance of maritime 
trade routes (to the region’s continued 
growth) has increased as well. For 
example, container shipment volumes 
increased by more than 180% between 
2001 and 2013. Over half of the 
world’s total container shipments (by 
volume) originates in the Asia-Paciﬁ c 
region, with China alone accounting for 
27%. Much of this has to transit narrow 
sea lanes and is a risk for countries that 
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rely on the free movement of goods by 
sea. This has led to increased piracy, 
as criminal organisations have shifted 
operations away from the Gulf of Aden 
and the Red Sea as they have become 
relatively well protected. 
   China, as well as many other Asia-
Paciﬁ c states, has a major interest in 
maintaining access to these important 
commercial routes, which has led 
to a change in focus for China’s 
defence policy—it now emphasises 
naval capability.5 Added to this, is the 
uncertainty as to where exactly the 
regional distribution of power will lie 
in coming years. This suspicion, allied 
to other security concerns, has led to 
increases in tension, resulting in policy 
shifts from other powers in the region 
and evidence of “action-reaction 
dynamics taking hold and inﬂ uencing 
regional states’ military programmes.”6
   As if this was not complex enough, 
four additional factors come into play. 
The ﬁ rst is the expanding power and 
ambition of China, an example of which 
was the declaration in late November 
2013 of an air defence identiﬁ cation 
zone over the disputed Senkaku 
Islands in the East China Sea.7 This 
was reﬂ ected in Japan’s Defence White 
Paper, published on 5 August 2014, 
which accused China of adopting “high-
handed actions with regard to issues 
of conﬂ icts of interest in the maritime 
domain, as exempliﬁ ed by its attempts 
to change the status quo by coercion.”8 
The Defence White Paper of July 2015 
echoed similar sentiments.9 Such 
incidents still occur today, with China 
sending four vessels, one of which was 
an armed coastguard ship and former 
naval frigate, into Japanese territorial 
waters around the disputed islands 
in December 2015.10 Such moves 
could be repeated over other disputed 
territories—the region is rife with border 
and territorial disputes.11
   Second, is the threat from North 
Korea, which has a proven ballistic 
missile capability and a continuing 
nuclear programme. The range of these 
missiles is enough to threaten major 
population centres on all four of the 
main Japanese islands.12
   Thirdly, and as Japan itself can testify 
with the earthquake and tsunami of 
201113, there is the recurrent need to 
respond to humanitarian and disaster 
relief emergencies. For example, air and 
maritime forces are “uniquely equipped 
to provide international aid and rapid 
response to natural and man-made 
disasters.”14 Military transport aircraft 
(such as the C-130, C-17 and A400-M) 
and vessels, such as amphibious 
assault ships (that have additional 
transport assets such as helicopters), 
pre-positioned supply ships and hospital 
ships, can quickly get to the area in need 
of help.15 
   Fourthly, is the heightened interest of 
the world’s one remaining superpower, 
the United States, which, starting in 
2011, refocused its attention on the 
region, partly as a result of Chinese 
moves. While this can be considered 
a signiﬁ cant shift in US policy, it is not 
a matter of US disengagement in Asia 
followed by US re-engagement, but a 
shift in emphasis and focus, building on 
An MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft on the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force helicopter destroyer, JS Hyuga 
(US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Molly A. Evans)
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the elaborate relations the US already 
has in the region. As such, the change  
in policy emphasis is a region-wide, 
multi-dimensional initiative, which 
consists of security, economic and 
diplomatic elements.16
A NEW ERA OF PROCUREMENT
   In 2013, Japan published new 
National Defence Programme 
Guidelines (NDPG – their version of a 
defence White Paper) and for the ﬁrst 
time, a National Security Strategy (NSS). 
The plans outlined a major restructuring 
of the JSDF combined with spending 
JPY 24.7 trillion ($240 billion) on new 
equipment up to 2018, in order to 
build a more responsive, ﬂexible and 
deployable JSDF, a process which is 
still ongoing.17 This is in conjunction 
with Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet 
approving changes to the interpretation 
of the post-war constitution to allow the 
JSDF to exercise the right to collective 
self-defence—a major change in 
Japan’s post-war security policy, which 
had a strong constitutional commitment 
to paciﬁsm.18  
   This is hardly surprising, given the 
events of 2010 when Japan arrested 
a Chinese trawler captain near the 
Senkaku Islands after his vessel had 
rammed Japanese coastguard ships. 
The Japanese eventually released him, 
but not before China had stopped the 
export of rare earth elements to Japan 
and allowed anti-Japanese protests.19 
This incident “sent a psychological 
message to Japanese policymakers that 
the Chinese really are serious”20 and 
that “the emergence of a more robust 
Chinese maritime presence does present 
an important challenge to Japan”.21 
   Japan does not have a centralised 
government procurement system. 
Government agencies “generally 
operate their own procurement rules 
that stem from legislation including 
the 1947 Accounts Act and the 1947 
Local Autonomy Act.”22 Until recently, 
the defence acquisition process was 
led by a Japanese Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) agency known as the Equipment 
Procurement and Construction Ofﬁce 
(EPCO), formerly known as the Central 
Procurement Ofﬁce (CPO). The EPCO 
handled procurements valued at JPY1.5 
million or more, as well as those that 
are considered ‘central procurement 
items.’ The MoD’s Bureau of Finance 
and Equipment (BFE) handles ‘local 
procurement items,’ which are generally 
of a lower value. EPCO implemented 
and managed virtually all of Japan’s 
defence acquisition programmes. The 
agency was staffed by around 520 
civilian employees and 80 from the 
military. They had the responsibility 
of not only acquiring major pieces 
of equipment and services, but also 
overseeing construction work at JSDF 
bases and lifecycle project management. 
EPCO was assisted by the Regional 
Defence Bureaus, which are tasked with 
supervising, inspecting and auditing 
acquisition programmes at a local level. 
EPCO’s budget amounted to about a 
quarter of the entire defence budget.23 
   EPCO’s principles of procurement 
were based on reform measures 
introduced in 1999 and its own rules for 
tendering and contracting. These include 
the promotion of transparency, fairness 
and a commitment to competition. 
However, many defence acquisition 
contracts managed by EPCO have 
been awarded on a ‘single source’ 
or ‘limited tendering’ basis, which 
falls into a category that can best be 
described as having ‘closed processes.’ 
This suggests that the stated aims of 
Japanese Ground Self-Defence Forces (Photo by Miki Yoshihito) 
(Photo by Miki Yoshihito)
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transparency and fairness have merely 
been a base position. The commitment 
to these principles could be further 
called into question given the continued 
concern over corruption in the defence 
acquisition process (see below).24  
   To combat these concerns and to drive 
enhancements and efﬁciencies across 
a range of defence-related activity 
(including procurement, production 
and exports), the MoD created a new 
agency, the Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics Agency (ATLA) on 2 October 
2015, with Hideaki Watanabe as its ﬁrst 
commissioner. Watanabe was previously 
Director General of the Technical 
Research and Development Institute 
(TRDI), which was incorporated into 
ATLA, along with EPCO and elements 
of the MoD’s BFE. The new agency 
will employ around 1,800 personnel, 
with about 400 from the JSDF, and 
consolidates the existing procurement 
divisions from the JSDF’s ground, air 
and maritime components.  
   ATLA will have a wide range of 
responsibilities, including tighter 
adherence to acquisition rules (a 
response to recent allegations of 
misconduct in several acquisition 
programmes), enhancing JSDF 
interoperability, achieving better value 
for money in the defence procurement 
budget, strengthening the domestic 
defence industrial base and support 
technical cooperation with allied 
countries—Japan lifted the ban on 
military exports in April 2014, allowing 
its industrial base to engage with foreign 
programmes.25 The Japanese MoD 
is also considering new contracting 
methods (implemented by ATLA), 
which aim to increase the incentive for 
companies to reduce costs and minimise 
risk (including that of cost overruns) by, 
amongst other things, more frequent 
information sharing.26
MOBILITY AND RAPID  
RESPONSE 
   The current restructuring ﬁnally moves 
the JSDF away from its Cold War posture 
of heavily mechanised forces stationed 
in northeast Japan to stop a Soviet 
invasion through Hokkaido and refocuses 
its defensive effort (with an emphasis 
on strategic mobility, amphibious lift, 
maritime power and air superiority) to the 
southwest, especially in the Nansei Island 
chains. These are the islands that also 
hold the majority of the 50,000 US troops 
stationed in Japan.27  
   Changes to the JSDF include:28 
t(SPVOE'PSDFToXJMMSFEVDFJUTIPMEJOH
of both main battle tanks (MBTs) and 
artillery pieces from around 830 and 
780 respectively (in 2013) to around 300 
each. It will reduce its regional units from 
eight divisions and six brigades, to ﬁve 
divisions and two brigades. In their place 
are units that are designated as ‘rapid 
deployment’ including three divisions, 
four brigades, an airborne brigade, a 
helicopter brigade and an amphibious 
brigade. The amphibious brigade 
will be based on an infantry regiment 
stationed in the Senkaku island chain, 
which was stood up for the ﬁrst time in 
March 201629, and eventually comprise 
3,000 personnel equipped with 17 MV-
22 Osprey aircraft and 52 Amphibious 
The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force minesweeper tender, JDS Bungo  
(Photo by LA Amanda McElrich NZ Defence Forces)
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Assault Vehicles (AAVs). Additional future 
acquisitions include 99 Manoeuvre 
Combat Vehicles (MCVs—a wheeled AFV 
with a 105 mm main gun), ﬁ ve Chinook 
CH-47JA helicopters and, potentially, 
AH-64 Apache helicopters. The MoD 
is also looking to replace the ageing 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Type 
82 reconnaissance vehicle, as well as the 
155 mm FH-70 towed howitzer.
t"JS'PSDFo5IF+BQBOFTF"JS'PSDFXJMM
reorganise some of its airborne early 
warning and control (AEW&C) groups 
into squadrons, convert a reconnaissance 
squadron into a ﬁ ghter squadron (for a 
total of 13), increase the total number 
of ﬁ ghter aircraft (from 260 to 280 
aircraft), continue upgrading the F-15J 
ﬂ eet and begin upgrading the F-2 ﬁ ghter 
ﬂ eet (essentially an F-16 variant). The 
acquisition of (up to) 42 F-35 aircraft will 
allow the JSDF to ﬁ nally retire its F-4J Kai 
Phantoms, while MHI and TRDI work on 
the ATD-X ﬁ ghter prototype. It plans to 
double the number of aerial refuelling 
squadrons (to two), expand its intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capability 
and acquire three HALE (High-Altitude 
Long-Endurance) Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle systems.
t.BSJUJNF'PSDFo+BQBOXJMMJODSFBTF
its combined destroyer and frigate ﬂ eet 
from 47 to 54 ships, add another two 
ships to its existing six Aegis-equipped 
destroyers for ballistic missile defence 
and upgrade the three Osumi-class 
amphibious assault ships. It also plans 
to acquire 10 Kawasaki P-1 maritime 
patrol aircraft (MPA), 26 Sikorsky-
Mitsubishi SH-60K helicopters and an 
additional ﬁ ve AgustaWestland MCH101 
helicopters. The submarine ﬂ eet will 
expand from 16 to 22 boats, through 
continued acquisition of the Soryu-class 
(the seventh of which was delivered in 
March 201630), as well as upgrades and 
service-life extensions to older vessels. 
The MoD is also in the process of 
acquiring two 24,000 tonne helicopter 
carriers, named Izumo (DDH-183) and 
Kaga (DDH-184), which will replace the 
two Shirane-class destroyers.
   Despite the Cold War having been 
more than 25 years ago, Japan has 
only recently begun a large-scale 
restructuring of its armed forces to 
take into account the new strategic 
environment—an environment affected 
by several factors including the 
expansion of economic activity in the 
region and the rise of Chinese power—
along with changes in how the post-war 
constitution can be interpreted. How 
quickly this happens and how far it 
goes depends on the efforts of Prime 
Minister Abe’s government to improve 
Japanese economic performance, 
reduce debt and reform the defence 
acquisition system. It is very much a 
work in progress. Q
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